Security Rules (RLS)
Overview
Section titled “Overview”Security rules let you define Row Level Security (RLS) policies for your PostgreSQL tables directly in your collection definitions. When the Drizzle schema is generated, Rebase creates the corresponding CREATE POLICY statements.
import { defineCollection } from "@rebasepro/cms-types";const postsCollection = defineCollection({ slug: "posts", name: "Posts", table: "posts", properties: { /* ... */ }, securityRules: [ { operation: "select", access: "public" }, { operations: ["insert", "update", "delete"], ownerField: "authorId" } ]});How It Works
Section titled “How It Works”- You define
securityRuleson a collection rebase schema generatecreates Drizzle schema with RLS enabledrebase db pushorrebase db migrateapplies the policies to PostgreSQL- Every query is filtered by the current user’s context automatically
The authenticated user’s identity is available in SQL via:
| Function | Returns |
|---|---|
rebase.uid() |
The current user’s ID |
rebase.roles() |
Comma-separated app role IDs |
rebase.jwt() |
Full JWT claims as JSONB |
These are set automatically per-transaction by the Rebase backend.
Convenience Shortcuts
Section titled “Convenience Shortcuts”Owner-based Access
Section titled “Owner-based Access”The simplest pattern — users can only access rows they own:
securityRules: [ { operation: "all", ownerField: "user_id" }]This generates: USING (user_id = rebase.uid())
Public Access
Section titled “Public Access”Allow anyone (including unauthenticated users) to read:
securityRules: [ { operation: "select", access: "public" }]This generates: USING (true)
Authenticated Access
Section titled “Authenticated Access”Allow any authenticated user:
securityRules: [ { operation: "select", access: "authenticated" }]Role-based Access
Section titled “Role-based Access”Restrict operations to specific roles:
securityRules: [ { operation: "all", roles: ["admin"] }, { operation: "select", roles: ["editor", "viewer"] }]Membership / Relational Access
Section titled “Membership / Relational Access”To scope access by membership in a related collection — e.g. “only rows whose
team the caller belongs to” — use the structured condition with
policy.existsIn. It compiles to a single correlated EXISTS subquery (no
per-row lookups), and is the safe, first-class alternative to hand-writing the
raw SQL shown below.
import { policy } from "@rebasepro/types";
// documents visible only to members of the document's team:securityRules: [ { operation: "select", condition: policy.existsIn({ collection: "team_members", // the join / membership collection where: policy.and( // correlate to the row being checked: policy.compare(policy.field("team_id"), "eq", policy.outerField("team_id")), // …and to the caller: policy.compare(policy.field("user_id"), "eq", policy.authUid()), ), }), },]Inside where, policy.field(...) refers to a column of the joined collection
(team_members), while policy.outerField(...) refers to a column of the row
being checked (documents). Combine with policy.authUid() to scope to the
current user. Because it is enforced by the database, the admin UI treats it as
server-authoritative.
The policy builder, in full
Section titled “The policy builder, in full”Imported from @rebasepro/types. Expressions compose; operands are the leaves.
| Expression | Compiles to |
|---|---|
policy.true() / policy.false() |
true / false |
policy.and(…) / policy.or(…) |
conjunction / disjunction |
policy.not(e) |
negation |
policy.compare(left, op, right) |
a comparison between two operands |
policy.rolesOverlap(roles) |
the caller has any of these app roles |
policy.rolesContain(roles) |
the caller has all of these app roles |
policy.authenticated() |
signed in — rebase.uid() is set and is not an anonymous sentinel. IS NOT NULL alone would be a tautology, since an anonymous request sets a sentinel rather than leaving it unset |
policy.serverContext() |
rebase.uid() IS NULL — see the caution below |
policy.existsIn({ collection, where }) |
a correlated EXISTS subquery |
policy.raw(sql) |
an escape hatch, inserted verbatim |
| Operand | Means |
|---|---|
policy.field(name) |
a column of the collection being checked — or, inside existsIn, of the joined one |
policy.outerField(name) |
inside existsIn, a column of the outer row |
policy.literal(value) |
a string, number, boolean or null |
policy.authUid() |
rebase.uid() |
policy.authRoles() |
rebase.roles() |
Raw SQL Expressions
Section titled “Raw SQL Expressions”For complex logic, use using and withCheck:
securityRules: [ { operation: "select", using: "EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM org_members WHERE org_members.org_id = {org_id} AND org_members.user_id = rebase.uid())" }]using— Filters which existing rows are visible (applies to SELECT, UPDATE, DELETE)withCheck— Validates new row values (applies to INSERT, UPDATE)
Column references use {column_name} syntax which gets resolved to the full table-qualified column.
Combining Shortcuts and SQL
Section titled “Combining Shortcuts and SQL”Mix convenience shortcuts with raw SQL:
securityRules: [ // Admins can do anything { operation: "all", roles: ["admin"], using: "true" }, // Regular users can only see their own rows { operation: "select", ownerField: "user_id" }, // Users can insert, but only for themselves { operation: "insert", withCheck: "{user_id} = rebase.uid()" }, // Locked rows cannot be updated { operation: "update", mode: "restrictive", using: "{is_locked} = false" }]Permissive vs Restrictive
Section titled “Permissive vs Restrictive”PostgreSQL has two policy modes:
- Permissive (default) — Multiple permissive policies are OR’d together. If any one passes, access is granted.
- Restrictive — Restrictive policies are AND’d together. All must pass.
securityRules: [ // Permissive: owners can access their rows { operation: "all", ownerField: "user_id" }, // Restrictive: but locked rows cannot be updated { operation: "update", mode: "restrictive", using: "{is_locked} = false", withCheck: "{is_locked} = false" }]Operations
Section titled “Operations”| Operation | SQL Equivalent | Description |
|---|---|---|
"select" |
SELECT |
Read rows |
"insert" |
INSERT |
Create new rows |
"update" |
UPDATE |
Modify existing rows |
"delete" |
DELETE |
Remove rows |
"all" |
All of the above | Shorthand for all operations |
You can also use operations (plural) to apply one rule to multiple operations:
{ operations: ["insert", "update", "delete"], ownerField: "authorId" }Full SecurityRule Interface
Section titled “Full SecurityRule Interface”SecurityRule is a union, not one open object: a rule picks exactly one way
of expressing its predicate, and the others are typed never so mixing them is a
compile error rather than a policy that silently ignores half of what you wrote.
// Shared by every variantinterface SecurityRuleBase { name?: string; // Policy name. Omit it and one is derived operation?: SecurityOperation; // "select" | "insert" | "update" | "delete" | "all" operations?: SecurityOperation[]; // …or several at once mode?: "permissive" | "restrictive"; // Default: "permissive" roles?: string[]; // App roles, via rebase.roles() pgRoles?: string[]; // Native Postgres roles — the CREATE POLICY `TO` clause. // NOT the same as `roles`. Default: ["public"]}
// …plus exactly one of:{ ownerField: string } // <column> = rebase.uid(){ access: "public" | "authenticated" } // the shortcut forms{ condition: PolicyExpression; // the structured builder — `policy.*` check?: PolicyExpression } // defaults to `condition`, as Postgres does{ using?: string; withCheck?: string } // raw SQLroles and pgRoles are the two that get confused. roles is an application
role, enforced inside the USING / WITH CHECK clause through
rebase.roles(). pgRoles is a database role, and controls which connections
the policy is attached to at all. Almost every project wants roles.
Examples
Section titled “Examples”Blog Platform
Section titled “Blog Platform”securityRules: [ // Anyone can read published posts { operation: "select", using: "{status} = 'published'" }, // Authors can see their own drafts { operation: "select", ownerField: "authorId" }, // Authors can create and edit their own posts { operations: ["insert", "update"], ownerField: "authorId" }, // Only admins can delete { operation: "delete", roles: ["admin"] }]Multi-Tenant SaaS
Section titled “Multi-Tenant SaaS”securityRules: [ { operation: "all", using: "EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM org_members WHERE org_members.org_id = {org_id} AND org_members.user_id = rebase.uid())" }]Anonymous Access (Public Inserts)
Section titled “Anonymous Access (Public Inserts)”A common need is allowing unauthenticated users to submit data — contact forms, newsletter signups, public applications. Rebase provides a clean pattern for this.
Recommended: a raw withCheck rule
Section titled “Recommended: a raw withCheck rule”import type { PostgresCollectionConfig } from "@rebasepro/types";
const contactMessagesCollection: PostgresCollectionConfig = { slug: "contact_messages", name: "Contact Messages", table: "contact_messages", securityRules: [ // Anyone can submit a contact message { operation: "insert", // A raw rule carries `using` (which rows are visible) and `withCheck` // (what a write must satisfy); an insert only exercises the latter. using: "true", withCheck: "true" }, // Only admins can read, update, or delete messages { operations: ["select", "update", "delete"], roles: ["admin"] } ], properties: { email: { name: "Email", type: "string" } }};The access: "public" shortcut generates a policy that allows the operation without requiring authentication.
For Lead Capture / Signups
Section titled “For Lead Capture / Signups”import type { PostgresCollectionConfig } from "@rebasepro/types";
const leadSignupsCollection: PostgresCollectionConfig = { slug: "lead_magnet_signups", name: "Lead Magnet Signups", table: "lead_magnet_signups", securityRules: [ // Allow anonymous inserts { operation: "insert", using: "true", withCheck: "true" }, // Admins can view all signups { operation: "select", roles: ["admin"] } ], properties: { email: { name: "Email", type: "string" } }};How Anonymous Requests Work
Section titled “How Anonymous Requests Work”When a request arrives without a JWT token, the Rebase backend sets the PostgreSQL session variables to:
| Variable | Value |
|---|---|
app.user_id |
'anonymous' |
app.user_roles |
'' (empty) |
This means:
rebase.uid()returns'anonymous'rebase.roles()returns an empty stringaccess: "public"policies pass because they generateUSING (true)/WITH CHECK (true)access: "authenticated"policies fail because they check for a real user IDownerFieldpolicies fail because no row will haveuser_id = 'anonymous'(unless explicitly set)
Advanced: Raw SQL for Anonymous
Section titled “Advanced: Raw SQL for Anonymous”If you need more granular control, use raw SQL:
securityRules: [ { operation: "insert", withCheck: "rebase.uid() = 'anonymous' OR rebase.uid() IS NOT NULL" }]Next Steps
Section titled “Next Steps”- Relations — Foreign keys and joins
- Entity Callbacks — Lifecycle hooks
- Custom Functions — Custom API endpoints
